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Our desire is that all the organizations of the Popular Front be strengthened.
Our desire is that all anti-fascist forces be consolidated, wherever they are to be
found. Although I know that this can lead to criticism of our position, of our
actions, never, never, can it be said that a single member, not a one, has been
attracted to the party by the promise of advancement or the lure of personal
gain.1
These words were spoken as part of a rousing closing speech made by Jesús
Hernández, a leading figure in the Spanish Communist Party (PCE), at
a party plenum held in March 1937. At the time Spain was nine months into
its brutal civil war which raged on until the final defeat of the republican
side at the hands of General Franco’s Nationalists in April 1939. The plenum
was held partly to publicize the growing strength of the communist party
but its central theme, echoed by all the speakers present, was to extol
support for the Popular Front as an alliance of all the political parties and
trade unions that supported the republic. In evoking the idea of the Popular
Front, and the language of anti-fascism which accompanied it, the PCE was
following policies common to the international communist movement.
In the context of the war in Spain, Hernández hammered home the message
that cooperation was the key to ultimate victory and that the PCE was
providing a selfless example in working toward that common goal, all of
which was reflected in the title of his speech: “Everything Within the
Popular Front.”
This plenum, and another held in November 1937, presented the PCE as
not just at the heart of the conflict in Spain but as part of a worldwide struggle
being led by the international communist movement against the threat of
1 Partido Comunista de España, Todo dentro del Frente Popular (Valencia: Ediciones del
Partido Comunista de España, 1937).
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fascism. The fact that Franco was actively aided by Germany and Italy added
to the sense that the civil war encapsulated all the great ideological and
international conflicts that had built up by the late 1930s. As a result, the
defense of the democratic republic appeared to offer the chance to strike
a blow against the seemingly inexorable advance of far-right and fascist
movements.While this feeling was strongly shared among liberals and leftists
of all political persuasions, making the commitment to support the republic
one of the great international causes of the time, it struck a particular chord
with communists. This was symbolized by the dispatch of the famous
International Brigades of volunteers from around the world – predominantly
but not exclusively communists – organized by the Communist International
(Comintern). Their decision to fight in Spain resulted in great part from the
prominence given by the Soviet Union and the international communist
movement since the mid 1930s to the need to counter the spread of fascism.
The establishment of virulently anti-democratic and anti-communist regimes
in Germany by the Nazis in 1933 and in Austria in 1934 by Engelbert Dollfuss
were the shocks that had finally prompted Soviet and communist leaders into
action. In particular, a remilitarized and aggressive Germany under Adolf
Hitler presented a direct threat to the USSR and his rise to power had
involved the destruction of the largest non-Soviet communist party.
The lesson that Soviet and communist leaders took was that the USSR and
communist parties were too weak by themselves successfully to resist the rise
of fascism. Under Stalin the USSR had become internationally isolated,
convulsed by the internal changes unleashed by his rule. Meanwhile, the
official policy of the Comintern and its member communist parties since 1928
had been to promote “Bolshevik-style” revolution around the globe and to
reject all ideological and political alternatives, including participation in
“bourgeois democracies” such as the Spanish republic created in 1931. Now
communist leaders increasingly accepted the need to seek alliances with
other powers, particularly the Western democracies, and with other political
movements on the liberal-left. Their dilemma, however, was how best to do
this in ways that were compatible with the ideological integrity and wider
aims of the communist cause. In May 1935 this led to the signing of a mutual
assistance pact between the USSR and France in a vain attempt to contain
German expansionism. Later in July–August of the same year, the Comintern
held its seventh and last world Congress in Moscow to discuss, among other
matters, the stance of the international communist movement toward fas-
cism. Decisions taken at that Congress paved the way for communist parti-
cipation in anti-fascist political alliances with other groups, subsequently
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known as popular fronts, and raised the possibility that they might also
become part of democratic governments.
The war in Spain marked the highpoint of this popular front approach and
is often cited as a prime example of the shift in this direction that the
Comintern had taken at its seventh world Congress. During the conflict,
communist propaganda lavishly celebrated the role of the PCE as heroic and
lauded it as an example of what could be achieved through anti-fascist unity
and adherence to the Popular Front. The achievements of other popular
fronts at the time were similarly highlighted. Here the principal achieve-
ments came through successful participation in electoral politics. Most nota-
ble was the victory in the French National Assembly elections of May 1936 of
a Front Populaire alliance of center-left parties. This included the formation
of a separate Popular Front committee in colonial Senegal that included local
communists and which supported the unsuccessful candidacy of the
Senegalese socialist Lamine Guèye in the same elections. Less well known,
but as significant in its own right, was the electoral and political left-wing
coalition initially formed in Chile in 1937. In the congressional elections of
that year the Popular Front was narrowly defeated, as was its candidate in the
presidential contest that followed shortly afterwards. However, in 1938 the
candidate of the Popular Front, Pedro Aguirre Cerda of the Radical Party,
finally captured the presidency with a small majority.
The association of the popular front concept with these dramatic devel-
opments has made it the most famous of the “lines” adopted by the
Comintern throughout its existence. Even decades later, official histories,
commemorations and memoirs viewed communist involvement in the
“good fight” against fascism as a moral example still to be emulated and
admired. This favorable propaganda justified the activities of the Comintern
and its member parties and provided evidence subsequently of communism’s
anti-fascist credentials. However, closer examination of popular fronts in
Spain and elsewhere suggests that their creation and nature were far from
straightforward, and their activities and achievements mixed. In fact, even to
talk of a coherent popular front strategy that was orchestrated and consis-
tently applied by the Comintern is misleading. The Seventh Congress of the
Comintern produced no such clear and transparent guide to action for its
member parties. Instead the popular front idea evolved and changed by
choice and circumstance. Nor did communist parties necessarily play
a leading role in the formation and direction of the political alliances which
took the name of popular front. Likewise, the relatively few popular fronts
that were created were often quite different in practice despite their shared
tim rees
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commitment to the cause of anti-fascism. Wartime Spain, in particular,
represented a special situation that produced a unique form of the popular
front and of communist involvement in it.
What all the popular fronts did share in common was their ultimate
failure, alongside the Soviet policy of alliances with the Western democra-
cies. They were not cohesive alliances and all proved unsustainable in the
face of internal political differences and deep dilemmas over policy.
The Spanish example, in particular, followed a very distinctive course and
demonstrated the limited ability of the communists decisively to influence
developments. Despite the optimistic hopes of Hernández and other Spanish
party leaders in 1937, the civil war ended ignominiously in internal fighting
within the republican side that finally destroyed the Popular Front; the result
was a crushing defeat that helped hasten the final end of the Comintern itself.
The experiment of “popular frontism” in France had already fallen apart
under the weight of internal divisions during 1938, followed by the final
dissolution of the Chilean example in early 1941. Their immediate successes
tended to be correspondingly short-lived and, at best, they delayed rather
than prevented the spread of “fascism.”
The Seventh Congress of the Comintern was called at a time of grave
uncertainty for the international communist movement and the Soviet
Union. The new head of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, had witnessed
at first hand the rise of the Nazis and the suppression of the German
Communist Party (KPD). In Czechoslovakia and France there were growing
calls from factions within their communist parties to abandon the attacks on
other organizations as “social fascists” and traitors to the working class
previously promoted by the Comintern in favor of greater meaningful
cooperation. Within the trade unions, in particular, there were also examples
of grassroots joint actions involving communist and socialist activists in order
to defend workers’ rights and to defend wages and working conditions as the
effects of economic depression deepened. Meanwhile, the USSR also faced
a corresponding threat from a resurgent Germany to the west and an
increasingly threatening Japanese presence to the east. For Stalin and his
coterie, concern with the security of the Soviet Union was matched by
a preoccupation with the tremendous domestic pressures unleashed by the
campaigns for collectivization and forced industrialization. While these fears
and uncertainty about the immediate future motivated the decision to call
a congress, Dimitrov and other leading figures in the Comintern were also
aware that the revolutionary idealism of Bolshevism was at the heart of its
appeal. The need to “recognize reality,” had therefore to be balanced by the
The Popular Fronts and the Civil War in Spain
259
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316137024.013
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 12 Feb 2019 at 16:10:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
continuing affirmation of the fundamental tenets of communist political
doctrine and identity.
No dramatic “about turn” in Comintern policy was actually announced at
the carefully managed Congress, attended by 513 representatives from sixty-
five communist parties. Rather the Comintern leadership signaled new
priorities in response to the threat of fascism while theoretically retaining
full support for the central aim of spreading Bolshevik-style revolution
around the globe. Most of the themes discussed were indistinguishable
from previous congresses: attacks on the leaders of other working-class
organizations, particularly socialists, as traitors to the cause of real revolu-
tion; vehement rejections of “Trotskyism” and other deviations from
Leninist orthodoxy; and belief in the USSR as the homeland of socialism
and in the inspirational leadership of Stalin. The most controversial item was
André Marty’s defense of the recently signed agreement between the USSR
and France, which was criticized by some delegates as a capitulation to the
capitalist and imperialist powers. Otherwise nothing in the language or termi-
nology used departed from the established political lexicon of communist
orthodoxy; instead change was introduced by subtle redefinitions and changes
of emphasis. In his report Dimitrov used a definition of fascism previously
agreed upon by the Comintern’s executive, famously describing it “as the open
terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most
imperialist elements of finance capital.” While this made clear that fascism
was rooted in capitalist society, it also suggested that it could not be seen as
simply a form of bourgeois rule like any other. Instead it posed a violent and
immediate threat which required a shift in communist tactics which Dimitrov
argued should be based upon the creation of a “united front of the working
class” which could lead to the formation of “anti-fascist people’s fronts.”2
The concept of the “united front” was already familiar, and had been used in
various forms since the founding of the Comintern in 1919. It was significant
that veteran delegates at the Congress, such as Jules Humbert-Droz, were not
permitted to speak for fear that they would point out what was now proposed
actually marked a step back to a position that the Comintern had held in the
early 1920s. The final resolutions of the Congress expressed the new formula as
“the creation of a broad anti-fascist popular front on the basis of the proletarian
united front.” Also included in passing were the possibilities of electoral
cooperation with non-working-class political parties and communist
2 Georgi Dimitrov, “The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International
in the Struggle of the Working Class Against Fascism,” in Georgi Dimitrov, Selected
Works, vol. II (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1972).
tim rees
260
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316137024.013
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Exeter, on 12 Feb 2019 at 16:10:41, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
involvement in “bourgeois governments,” but these steps were only to be
agreed on a case-by-case basis. Also discussed were the legitimate use of
armed force in the face of fascist violence and the formation of workers’
militias for the purposes of defense.
Stalin’s lukewarm approval, echoed by loyal communist party leaderships,
was a sign of his personal disinterest but also of the general uncertainly about
what actually was changing. Though no grandiosely titled “popular front”
strategy was, in fact, adopted at the Congress, this did not mean that its
practical consequences were actually negligible. Most significant was the
endorsement of a less dogmatic and prescriptive approach to political tactics
on the part of the Comintern. Giving greater priority to the struggle against
fascism helped communist parties to take a more flexible attitude toward
their activities. This was further reinforced, at least rhetorically, by a call from
Dimitrov for party leaderships to take more responsibility for their own
actions and to make decisions based upon a self-assessment of local political
conditions. This did not mean that parties had carte blanche to do as they liked,
far from it. But it did mean they could explore a greater range of political
opportunities and tactics in the name of anti-fascism. What these subse-
quently entailed in practice were matters of interpretation and compromise,
as the prescriptions that the Congress had offered were far too vague to serve
as any kind of clear blueprint for action. Nevertheless, it was this more
permissive atmosphere that subsequently enabled at least some communists
to respond more flexibly to local political opportunities.
It quickly became evident that creating “united fronts” of the working class
as a prerequisite for “people’s fronts” was unrealistic and even offers of limited
joint action were mostly rejected. Nor were all communists enthusiasts for
collaboration; compromise and negotiation did not sit easily with Bolshevik
diehards and many activists were uneasy. In the case of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) there was outright rejection when Comintern leaders
encouraged the party to seek accommodation with Chiang Kai-shek’s
Nationalists, with whom they were engaged in a civil war. Only an attack on
China by Japan in 1937 would bring them together in a fragile alliance of
convenience. Years of attacks on other working-class parties by communists
could also not simply be overcome overnight. Overtures to the Labour and
Socialist International for cooperation were rejected, as were offers of joint
action by the overwhelming majority of socialist parties. Although there were
sympathetic voices within socialist ranks, there was also a deep well of distrust
of communistmotives based on past experience, which reflected a bitter rivalry
between sibling movements that also claimed to speak for the working classes.
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For many socialists, communist anti-fascism appeared as just a tactical facade
behindwhich lay the same old hegemonic intentions. In addition, the small size
and marginal importance of the great majority of communist parties reduced
even further the appeal of any kind of partnership with them. The spread of
right-wing dictatorial regimes in Europe and the Americas, alongside the
large areas of the globe under authoritarian colonial rule, severely limited
the number of countries in which it was even possible to organize and act
openly. In liberal-democratic Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Britain and
Ireland, where the threat from the far right was relatively weak, there was
little incentive for noncommunists to cooperate. Even in Czechoslovakia,
which was the only part of Central Europe not under authoritarian rule and
with a strong communist party, offers of unity and cooperation were rejected
by the socialists. Consequently, unity on communist terms was therefore
overwhelmingly rejected and it was only in very specific circumstances that
it proved possible to create alliances.
The Popular Fronts that were formed in France, Spain and Chile during
1936 and 1937 were actually loose electoral alliances, in which communists
mostly played minor and variable roles, rather than ones based upon united
fronts of the organized working class. Their creation was driven only partly
by a desire to forestall the spread of fascism, though anti-fascist rhetoric was
certainly part of the ideological glue that bound them together. More
important was blocking the political right, in whatever guise, from govern-
ment at times of acute economic crisis and social polarization. Only in France
was the role of the Communist Party (PCF) truly crucial. A large and well-
organized party, with an independent trade union federation (CGTU), the
PCF was an established force on the political left. When its leader, Maurice
Thorez, began to call for a Front Populaire (in one of the first uses of the
term) from 1934 the groundwork for cooperation with the socialist move-
ment was already being laid through local cooperation between trade unions
and later by joint candidacies in municipal elections. While the Comintern
could now endorse these actions, it was also clear that a communist–socialist
election pact was incapable of defeating the coalition of the conservative–right
that seemed poised to take power as the existing government faltered. It was
only when the middle-class Radical Party and a number of smaller leftist
parties added their weight that a Popular Front was finally agreed to fight
the April 1936 elections.
In contrast, the much smaller Chilean Communist Party (PCCh) and the
Spanish PCE were in no position to play such pivotal roles to bring about
popular fronts. Calls from the party leaders, Carlos Contreras Labarca and
tim rees
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José Díaz, for united fronts and people’s fronts were initially rejected or
ignored, particularly by the Chilean and Spanish socialist parties. In Chile, it
was the defeat of the disunited center-left parties in the March 1937 congres-
sional elections, plus the prospects that the right would also win forthcoming
presidential elections, that provided the impetus for a Popular Front. Its key
creators were the radical and socialist parties, with radical-socialists, demo-
crats and communists playing only lesser roles. The PCE was even more
fortunate in finding itself as part of the Spanish Popular Front, given that it
played no active part in its creation. Instead in Spain it was the socialist and
left republican parties which were at the heart of negotiations in late 1935 to
form an electoral alliance – or rather to re-form on new terms the electoral
and government coalition that had brought the republic into being in 1931,
but which had collapsed in 1933. A disastrous attempt in October 1934 to oust
the resulting center-right government had ended in failure, provoking a brief
workers’ rising in the mining region of Asturias which had been crushed by
the army and police forces. Subsequently, the PCE had erroneously tried to
claim credit for this “October Revolution,” gaining some credibility with the
Comintern as a result. It certainly shared the same fate as all the other parties
of the left in finding its leaders imprisoned or in exile and its press silenced.
The calling of new elections for February 1936 then provided the impetus to
form an electoral coalition to keep the right from power. Initially, the PCE
was excluded from negotiations by the republicans and moderate wing of
the Socialist Party (PSOE). However, for his own purposes the leader of the
socialist left, Largo Caballero, insisted that the PCE be brought into the
Popular Front, alongside a host of other smaller movements of the far left.
Otherwise, the party would have remained isolated. This was a decision that
Caballero was later to regret bitterly as it unwittingly gave the PCE
a credibility that it otherwise lacked. The degree to which the PCE had no
say in this process was made evident when its vehement objections to the
admittance of the “Trotskyists” of the POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist
Unification) were simply ignored. Consequently, the PCE appeared as a very
incidental force in an unwieldy electoral bloc that ranged from moderate
republicans to both orthodox and dissident communists.
This rather fragile unity was reflected by electoral platforms that were
compromises designed to avoid disputes between the coalition partners and
to maximize popular appeal. Keeping the right from power and containing
the lurking threat of fascism reflected the only really common aims.
The electoral program of the Spanish Popular Front also included promises
of an amnesty for those imprisoned after the October rising. Though broadly
The Popular Fronts and the Civil War in Spain
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“progressive” in outlook, there was little otherwise in the agreed programs of
the Popular Fronts that could be identified as specifically reflecting the aims
and aspirations of their communist participants. Equally, however, there was
nothing in them that was particularly objectionable. More positively, there
was a commitment to economic and social reform though often with little in
the way of specific policies. Cultural differences also played a significant part
in drawing together the participants in these Popular Fronts, and in differ-
entiating them from their opponents. The most obvious example was in
terms of the deep clerical–anticlerical divisions within Chile, France and
Spain, with the Popular Fronts presenting themselves as champions of
“modern” values against religious reaction. This encompassed matters
far beyond just the position of the Catholic Church and included attitudes
toward gender roles, education, the family and sexual relations. The acquies-
cence of the communists gave a strong impression that they had tacitly
accepted “bourgeois” norms, prompting some criticism from within
party ranks. This was reinforced by the increasing use of “national” and
“patriotic” symbols by communist parties, though in ways that tried to
reinterpret them in anti-fascist and revolutionary forms. This addressed
deeper questions about how communists could reconcile a commitment to
the creation of a universal proletarian civilization with the existence of
liberal nation-states, particularly when one of the most effective charges
against them had been that they were “unpatriotic.” The French Popular
Front, in particular, promoted the idea that it was saving the nation from
forces linked to threatening outside powers – a description that could
equally apply to the PCF and its links to the USSR. Not surprisingly, the
French party, but also others, struggled to find a middle ground over how
they related to “their” nations.
Willingness to accept these broad “anti-fascist” electoral positions might
have given the impression that communists had quietly surrendered any real
commitment to a separate revolutionary mission and identity. But any
appearances that communist ideology had been decisively “diluted” or
“toned down,” as has sometimes been argued, masked a more complex
reality. While the communists accepted these agreements in order to be
included in Popular Fronts this did not therefore mean they had forsworn
their ultimate ambitions, as was demonstrated during the electoral
campaigns themselves. While they fulfilled their obligation to support all
the parliamentary or presidential candidates from their respective Popular
Front coalitions under the common programs, they continued to campaign
separately on their own issues, including the abolition of private property and
tim rees
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the creation of future Soviet-style regimes. In communist eyes tactical sup-
port for the Popular Front did not alter their long-term strategic aims nor did
they cease to see themselves as essentially revolutionaries. In fact, the inclu-
sion of communist candidates in all the electoral slates presented to voters in
Spain and France in February and April–May 1936 actually enhanced their
political profiles and gave them new platforms from which to espouse their
ideological views. Similar opportunities were given to the Chilean commu-
nists during the presidential campaigns of 1937 and 1938. Communist activism
was also crucial in strengthening the leftist character of the Popular Front and
in identifying this with communism. For the PCE, in particular, this was to
prove a crucial boost to the party’s credibility, helping it to emerge from
political marginality toward becoming an established force alongside its
anarchist and socialist rivals. However, party leaders and the Comintern
were acutely aware of the “danger” posed by an increasing accommodation
with the bourgeois regimes they existed to overthrow and with other
political movements that they were still striving to supplant. And this fear
helped guide their actions during the euphoria of the so-called Popular Front
springs that followed.
These electoral victories did not lead directly to governments that were
representative of the Popular Front alliances that had produced them.
In every case the goal of keeping the right from power was achieved, and
also brought the PCE seventeen parliamentary deputies, having previously
had only one, while the PCF gained seventy-two seats. The election of
Aguirre Cerda to the presidency in Chile in 1938 served the same essential
purpose, though rather bizarrely his victory was achieved with the
last-minute endorsement of his candidacy by the Chilean Nazi Party. The
question then was how far cooperation would continue subsequently in
terms of forming and supporting new governments. In Spain the issue did
not arise as there was never any intention to form a coalition government of
the Popular Front, which to all intents and purposes ceased to exist having
served its electoral purpose. Instead, the left republican parties formed
a minority government, with no representation from the working-class
movements including, crucially, the socialists. Similar circumstances applied
in Chile in 1938 when the PCCh was denied cabinet positions in the govern-
ment headed by Aguirre Cerda in which the radicals were utterly dominant,
save for a few minor positions given to the socialists. In contrast, in June 1936
the PCF was directly offered ministerial posts in a coalition government by
the socialist leader Léon Blum. Considerable discussion with the Comintern
followed before the leaders of the PCF finally declined the offer on the
The Popular Fronts and the Civil War in Spain
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grounds that acceptance would compromise their ideological integrity and
be met with hostility by party members. Instead the new administration was
formed by the socialists and radicals alone. It was clear in every case that
mutual wariness between communists and noncommunists continued to
run deep.
The position adopted by the Comintern was, in effect, that the popular
front was fine as a defensive shield in the anti-fascist struggle but it should not
to be allowed otherwise to inhibit communists’ freedom of action.
The ambiguous position initially proved advantageous in the face of rising
social and political tensions. Freed from the constraints of government, the
communists were able to become fully involved in waves of worker protests
and demands for increased social welfare. The communist trade union
federation in France and the communist factions within the socialist unions
in Spain often played leading roles, responding in many cases to pressures
from their grassroots memberships. In France, cooperation with the socialist
union federation led to a general strike and factory occupations in May–June
1936 that ended in agreements with employers conceding a range of improve-
ments in wages and conditions of work. Spain also saw a steep rise in strike
activity and land invasions during the spring, with communists acting along-
side their more numerous anarchist and socialist counterparts. The large
May Day parades mounted in the major cities of both countries publicly
celebrated these achievements, demanded solidarity with the Soviet Union
and exhorted further advances in the struggle against fascism. In Chile the
PCCh also played a key role in urban and rural labor disputes, pressing in
particular for agrarian reform. By placing pressure on the new governments,
communist parties became part of a de facto left opposition in both the street
and from within parliament. In Spain the PCE shared an almost identical
position to Caballero’s wing of the socialists, closely linked to the unions,
which called for a socialist transformation of society.
A surge in communist popularity and strengthened organizations were
the immediate rewards, further reinforcing the sense that the parties involved
had chosen their positions wisely. All the parties gained members, most
notably and dramatically in the case of the PCE whose ranks nearly quad-
rupled between March and July 1936. This upward trajectory, which contin-
ued into 1937, finally turned the PCE into a “party of the masses” on a scale
which began to match the socialists. The profiles of those joining were also
broadly similar: predominantly young, mostly male trade unionists with no
previous political affiliations; this was exactly the constituency previously
dominated by the left wing of the socialist movements. In Spain this marked
tim rees
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the beginning of a complex process of cooperation and rivalry by which the
communists were to displace Largo Caballero’s section of the socialists.
Communist unions or union factions, as in Spain, also flourished. This
included the spread of communist unionism into the countryside for the
first time, mostly among rural laborers but also with the formation of peasant
leagues in Chile. Inevitably these developments impacted upon relations
with other working-class movements, particularly the socialists. In Spain
this was accompanied by a realignment of political organizations with
novel consequences. The growing youth section of the PCE formally joined
its socialist counterpart in a new body, the United Socialist Youth (JSU),
whose formation in April 1936 was facilitated and approved by the
Comintern. There were also unapproved negotiations between four small
“Marxist” groups in Catalonia, including the Catalan section of the PCE,
which finally resulted in their merger into a new party, the Unified Socialist
Party of Catalonia (PSUC) in July 1936. The leaders of the PSUC sought
recognition from the Comintern as a party separate from the PCE; when this
was finally granted in 1939 Spain became the only country with two commu-
nist parties. In Spain, at least, it seemed that the long-sought project of
a single party of the working class under communist tutelage was finally
making progress.
These communist successes came at a price in terms of tensions with their
anti-fascist partners and in exacerbating social and political divisions. To their
electoral allies the French and Spanish communists appeared opportunistic
and unreliable. This mistrust was at its deepest with their respective socialist
parties, which feared that under the banner of cooperation the communists’
intentions were as predatory as ever. Their growing prominence, both within
and without the institutions of government and the state, also helped fuel
anti-communism and the rise of the radical right. The Comintern’s policy
that communist parties should form armed “self-defense” organizations both
reflected and contributed to a corresponding spread of violence. But this did
not mean that communist leaders were blind to the risks that were being run.
Parties were also warned of the dangers of provocations by the right amidst
instances of sporadic violence. In France and Chile these never reached the
point of a complete breakdown in order, but the fears were real. In May 1936
the Comintern, concerned at the signs of growing polarization and political
violence in Spain, specifically informed the PCE leaders that they needed to
avoid weakening the authority of the government, presided over by the left
republican parties, to the point that it might collapse and open the door to
fascism: It was to prove a prescient warning.
The Popular Fronts and the Civil War in Spain
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The sudden outbreak of civil war in Spain produced conditions that not
only led to a revival of the Popular Front but were to transform its nature and
the role of the communists within it. Following the attempted military coup
of 17–18 July 1936 that sparked off the war, there was a near-collapse of state
authority. In those areas that had not fallen to the insurgents and their right-
wing allies, the ensuing power vacuum was filled by a patchwork of organi-
zations that assumed local authority. At the forefront were the trade unions
and the political parties of the left, particularly where they exercised armed
force through militias or retained the support of local police and military
forces. Within the emerging loyalist zone this decisively reinforced the
importance of the working-class movements, and marked the relative eclipse
of the middle-class republican parties in terms of their real influence.
An immediate casualty of the war was the all-republican government placed
into office after the February elections. The nature of local control varied
hugely, depending upon the mix of organizations and political groups in any
given village, town, or city neighborhood. Representatives formed ad hoc
committees to deal with the practical problems of running their localities,
replacing or displacing the previous system of government and authority in
the process. The demands upon them were huge: ensuring security and
defense, organizing production and work, and meeting the practical needs
of the local population. While sheer necessity was a primary driver, this also
represented a radical and unplanned alteration to existing social and political
structures. In areas such as the city of Barcelona and the region of Aragón
where they predominated, many anarchists and the dissident communists of
the POUM consequently viewed this as an opportunity finally to achieve
their different revolutionary goals.
Anti-fascist cooperation accordingly gained a new urgency in what quickly
became a life-and-death struggle for survival and to shape the future of
Spanish society. Members of the PCE and the Catalan communists in the
newly formed PSUC were active participants in these developments, some-
times taking prominent roles in places like Madrid and Valencia where they
had a strong presence. Likewise, members of the party militia, the Workers’
and Peasants’ Anti-Fascist Militia (MAOC), swelled by a rush of new volun-
teers, were quickly caught up in the initial confused fighting. Communists
also joined local committees and were enthusiastic participants in activities
such as the seizure of property from suspected nationalist supporters and other
“security” measures. But how the conflict was to be conducted, particularly
in terms of any reconstituted system of government, was a question that
those on the republican side were immediately forced to confront in the face
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of the advancing insurgents. The problem was that, while they were united in
their desire to defeat their “fascist” opponents, they were not all in agreement
as to how best that was to be achieved, nor to what final end.
A return to a revised form of popular front was an obvious answer. While
there was a broad consensus that cooperation was a necessity, the ensuing
process of reconstituting political alliances proved problematic. As the largest
political movement, allied to a strong trade union federation, it was clear that
the Socialist Party would have to be at the heart of any effective coalition.
However, when Largo Caballero agreed to form a new national government
it took protracted negotiations before a new cabinet was announced in
early September 1936. One stumbling block was whether the PCE could be
persuaded to participate. Initially, the collapse of the rising in large parts of
Spain, including most of the major cities, mistakenly convinced PCE leaders
that the insurgency would soon implode – a message that the Comintern’s
advisor, Vittorio Codovilla, also passed on to Moscow. Even after it became
clear that this was not the case, the Spanish communists saw no need to alter
their existing political stance. Accordingly, when offered government posts
the PCE rejected the offer on the understanding that this was Comintern
policy. It was only after consultation with Moscow that this decision was
reversed in line with the assessment by the Comintern and Soviet leadership
that the grave threat posed by fascism in Spain now justified such involve-
ment. It was similar thinking, matched by growing evidence of the extent of
Axis aid for the nationalists, which also prompted the exceptional offer of
Soviet military aid to the republicans – a policy that ran counter to the
nonintervention promoted by the Western Allies and which was to fatally
undermine Stalin’s attempts to reach an accord with them.
Two communist minsters, Jesús Hernández and Vicente Uribe, subse-
quently joined the first truly representative Popular Front government in
Spain. This new precedent was later to be followed in Chile when commu-
nists joined a similar coalition government with none of the prohibitions that
had previously been placed on the French party. Along with socialists,
Caballero’s government also contained left republicans, Catalan nationalists
and three members of the anarchist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo
(CNT). Enticing anarchist ministers into the government had proved an even
greater task, requiring them to compromise their deepest principles at the
cost of dividing the anarchist movement in the process. To make matters
even more complicated, separate coalition governments were also created in
the autonomous regions of Catalonia and the Basque Country. Regional
nationalists headed both of these administrations, in alliance with
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republicans, socialists and communists. In the Basque Country, the regional
section of the PCE played only a minor role holding no significant ministerial
positions. In contrast, in Catalonia the Catalan communists within the newly
formed PSUC were a more important component of the coalition, particu-
larly as the regional CNT refused to participate. Even so, PSUC leaders were
unable to prevent, despite their vociferous objections, the inclusion of
a representative, Andreu Nin, from the Trotskyist POUM. In practice, there-
fore, what emerged was not a single cohesive popular front but a plurality of
individually negotiated popular fronts that varied in composition and with
overlapping, and potentially competing, areas of authority.
Like all the other loyalist groups, the Spanish communists were forced to
radically rethink their political position in the light of these new circum-
stances. The choices they faced were not easy, particularly in terms of their
self-identification as revolutionaries and their previous reluctance to com-
promise too deeply with the “bourgeois” republic to whose defense they
were now committed. The most obvious was the absolute commitment to
the Popular Front, now radically reimagined as not just an electoral alliance
but the basis for a reconstructed state. Achieving and preserving unity was of
paramount importance in winning the war, and the Comintern constantly
reminded the PCE and PSUC leaderships of this. But this was now taken to
mean the translation of the Popular Front into every institution of authority,
including the military forces. This redefined the republic itself as no longer
just a “bourgeois” democracy but as an anti-fascist regime with “progressive”
features which included state direction of the economy, the redistribution of
landed estates, and forms of workers’ control under government supervision.
This led to the idea that the Spanish and Catalan communists were promot-
ing a “democratic republic of a new type,” sensitive to the concerns of more
enlightened members of the middle class, but essentially dedicated to the
interests of the working class and poor peasantry. This redefinition also
allowed the Spanish communists to vigorously defend a switch from
previously attacking the parliamentary regime to now defending it.
Moreover, they also presented the war not as a civil war at all but as a war
of “national liberation” against the Axis powers and their fascist allies within
Spain. Although falling short of the full Bolshevik ideal, this allowed the
communists to argue that they were still acting as revolutionaries – while
simultaneously rejecting as “absurd” the revolutionary claims of the
anarchists and POUM. This reformulation was undertaken in consultation
with the Comintern and particularly with Palmiro Togliatti, its deputy leader
and representative in Spain during the second half of the war, giving it wide
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importance as a further refinement of communist thinking about the Popular
Front and its potential as a route toward a socialist society.
It was really only at this point that the Comintern embraced the Popular
Front fully, though this did nothing to dispel the suspicion in the eyes of
noncommunists that this was a subterfuge. The PCE and PSUC continually
defended themselves against charges of opportunism and sectarianism made
in response to their rapid rise to prominence during the early phase of the
war. Indeed, by the spring of 1937 communists were found holding positions
of responsibility in all the organizations and institutions created by the
republic, including the army, police and security services. The numbers of
party members had also grown rapidly to make the PCE a truly mass party
after years of marginality and its members also played key roles within other
organizations. In addition, the PCE sponsored a swathe of so-called mass
organizations open to all comers and which provided a variety of health and
welfare services, produced propaganda and purported to represent groups
such as “anti-fascist” women and peasants. The PCE also continued to argue
for the creation of a united party of the working class, meaning the fusion of
the communists with the socialists – a proposal that was entirely dismissed by
the socialists. It was not so surprising, therefore, that other members of the
Popular Front coalition – particularly the anarchists and left socialists – found
the PCE threatening and possibly duplicitous in its intentions.
The PCE presented itself as making great sacrifices in order to preserve the
Popular Front, but this was balanced by an increasingly aggressive stance
toward anyone perceived to threaten its unity. It was a natural corollary to
the changes in communist thinking that anyone who did not fully support the
Popular Front that represented “the people,” and the creation of a state
based upon it, was either a “fascist” or was acting in ways that consciously
or unconsciously aided fascism. Communist rhetoric and actions were
accordingly uncompromising toward anyone labeled a fascist, promising
their destruction as enemies of “the anti-fascist people.” By definition this
included anyone in the nationalist camp, but it also included elements within
the republican side such as “uncontrollable” anarchists who rejected
a centralized war effort and, above all, the Trotskyists of the POUM.
Coinciding with the turn toward the terror in the USSR, which also engulfed
the Comintern, the PCE and PSUC conducted a vigorous campaign against
their rivals in the POUM, arguing that they should be excluded from the
Popular Front and suppressed as disguised fascists. Doing anything about this
was, however, another matter. There was to be a persistent tension between
what the party leadership, and the Comintern, desired and the ability to
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realize those desires within the confines of coalition politics. Despite the
growing prominence of the Spanish and Catalan communists, they were
never in a position to dictate government policy at any level – at least not
without running the risk of fatally undermining the Popular Front by alienat-
ing other parties in it. In particular, the need to keep the bulk of the anarchists
on board and to keep good relations with the socialists was always of
fundamental importance. This was to lead to continued frustrations and it
rather confirmed the communist fear that alliances posed a potential trap in
terms of pursuing their own aims and political identity.
The wartime Popular Front in Spain never proved the stable and cohesive
coalition, united in its purpose, that the communists had hoped for. Lots of
different factors contributed to this, not least the tensions and rivalries
between the socialists and anarchists. The underlying pressures came, how-
ever, from the failure to turn the tide of the war in favor of the republicans.
By the spring of 1937 this focused in particular on Largo Caballero’s leadership
of the government, and specifically on his insistence on retaining the addi-
tional role of minister of war. Critics from the right of his own party, allied to
the republicans and communists, gradually withdrew their support for him,
demanding a greater drive toward centralizing the war effort. In May this
growing political crisis was compounded by the outbreak of street fighting in
Barcelona (the so-called May Days) where local tensions exploded into
confrontation between forces of the regional government and local anar-
chists and supporters of the POUM. Although suppressed by force, this
precipitated the temporary withdrawal of anarchist ministers and a cabinet
coup that removed Caballero from power. The new socialist prime minister,
Juan Negrín, from the right of the party, pursued a policy of centralization
which included taking greater control over Catalonia and reducing the power
of the trade unions. The government, strongly urged on by the communists,
also banned the POUM (and ignored the murder of Andreu Nin by Soviet
agents) and marginalized the anarchists. Although the same organizations
remained represented in the Popular Front, and in the coalition government,
this effectively signaled a realignment in which the right of the Socialist Party
took power from the left and the communists and republicans shifted their
allegiances accordingly. Nevertheless, despite some significant attempts to
seize the military advantage, the war continued to go against the republicans.
In March 1939 the government was overthrown in an internal military coup,
backed by a range of supporters who had become disillusioned with the
failure to end the war and who desired a negotiated peace with Franco.
Strongly proclaiming their anti-communist credentials, they were rebuffed
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and the remnants of the republic collapsed. This internal rupture and
decisive military defeat brought a bitter final end to the Popular Front in
Spain. Summoned to Moscow and fearful of retribution, the leaders of the
PCE and Comintern advisors naturally blamed everyone but themselves
for its failure.
As it was, the anti-fascist alliances elsewhere already seemed to be in a state
of decay. In France the Popular Front had finally dissolved in August 1938
following mounting and irreconcilable policy and political differences among
its participants. The PCF had increasingly opposed the government, domi-
nated by the more conservative Radical Party after Blum lost power
in June 1937. Disagreements covered domestic labor and economic policies,
the failure of France to aid the Spanish republic in the civil war, and the
signing of the Munich agreement – the last of which led to a disastrous
general strike called by the communist unions. Similar tensions also pulled
apart the Popular Front in Chile during 1940. As a consequence, the PCCh
fought the 1941 congressional elections alone but, nevertheless, gained seats
for the first time. However, the Soviet and Comintern leadership were not
concerned for long with these failures as the signing of the Nazi–Soviet pact
in August 1939 immediately made anti-fascism an embarrassment rather than
a priority. Instead the Comintern urged its member parties to denounce the
subsequent outbreak of war in Europe as a capitalist conflict and to oppose
the war efforts of the Western democracies, sowing consternation and
confusion among the ranks of communists around the world.While dramatic
and shocking, this reversal marked the final abandonment of a policy of
political alliances and cooperation that already seemed exhausted.
The achievements of the various Popular Fronts now appeared fleeting as
the international communist movement found itself once again thrown into
crisis and uncertainty. With its functionaries decimated by the Soviet terror
and lacking any clear role after the civil war in Spain, the Comintern itself
was moribund and completely sidelined by Stalin.
From a communist perspective, the Spanish Civil War saw the popular
front idea taken to its most developed form as the potential basis for a new
type of the “anti-fascist” state. However, this was not really the result of any
conscious strategy but largely occurred as a reaction to circumstances not
previously envisioned. Indeed, it would be wrong to describe the Comintern
as having adopted a popular front “strategy” as such, let alone one that led
inexorably to this political outcome – this only appeared to be the case with
the benefit of hindsight. Nevertheless, the more pragmatic approach
adopted by the Comintern to political alliances and joint actions in the
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name of anti-fascism was important. To a great extent this reflected the
communist experience of popular fronts as a whole, where a more accurate
description of the changes after 1935 was later summed up by a prominent
Spanish communist, Santiago Carrillo, as having introduced “firmness and
strategic intelligence into the project of change of that period.”3 Nor was this
simply a passing phase. Instead, this more flexible attitude and the notion of
the Popular Front (or something very like it) were to become enduring
features of international communism and part of the established political
lexicon of the left more generally – although it required the Axis attack on the
USSR in June 1941 to see a decisive revival. Suddenly, the demands of war and
resistance to occupation placed opposition to fascism even more strongly at
the forefront of Soviet and communist priorities. At this point the communist
role in the war in Spain, and the idea of the Popular Front more generally,
once again became a model to be applauded and applied. The forms that
these were to take – from the “anti-fascist people’s democracies” of postwar
Eastern Europe to the ill-fated Popular Unity government of Salvador
Allende in Chile during the 1970s – were never exact repetitions of the
experiences of the 1930s. Likewise, the central unsolvable dilemma of
“popular frontism” endured: how to achieve genuine cooperation for an
apparently greater good while preserving the assumed purity of
communist ideals.
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